Debt intolerance and the 90 per cent debt threshold: two impossibility theorems

Two propositions underpin the retreat from post-crisis fiscal expansion instituted by several G7 governments in the summer of 2010. One is that the threat of debt intolerance is general: the reasoning is that the sharp rise in government debt levels caused by post-crisis fiscal expansion will force investors to abandon government bonds in favour of some other asset class. The other proposition is that there is a one-size debt threshold: the reasoning is that no government, those of the G7 countries included, can escape the serious consequences of debt intolerance and the threat of exit should its debt to GDP ratio reach 90 per cent. This paper argues that neither of these propositions can have credibility at a time of continuing global economic slowdown and consequent contraction in the global supplies of investable assets. At such a time investors cannot possibly hold up the threat of intolerance to core economy governments because they have no choice but to store substantial portions of their wealth in the latter's bonds, a fact which in turn means that the debt thresholds for core economy governments cannot possibly be the same as the average for other governments.