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Two factors determine the legitimacy of property reform: the type of regime transition and the production regime. In a “normalizing transition,” as in eastern Europe, property reform is legitimated as part of the general turn to Western conceptions of law. However, since this legitimacy is linked to political rather than economic ideas, the legitimacy of property reform can be short-lived. As time passes, the political implications of the organization of work, what I call a production regime, reassert themselves and set the stage for a reaction against privatization. This is the pattern in Russia, where property reform has progressed quickly, but has also run up against popular protest. In a revolution from above, or what I call a passive revolution, the legitimacy of property reform must be created by the regime. This requires work at the level of ideology, such as redefining the terms of economics. The regime must also contain working class demands by giving workers stability while transforming the production regime. The changed production regime, along with effective ideological work, can provide a more solid base for property reform in the future than that created as part of a normalizing transition. China has taken this slower, but perhaps ultimately more stable, road to reforming urban property relations.
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Harry Williams (1998) studied this question.
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