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This article examines Korea's politics of identity in the form of Asianism in the modern period, especially since Korea's incorporation into the modern world system in the late nineteenth century. Asianism, and regionalism generally, has become a salient policy strategy for the current South Korean government. However, Asianism has been a primary ideological current in modern Korea whose most recent incarnation should be understood in the larger historical context. This study traces the development of Asianism in four different periods: precolonial, colonial, Cold War, and post‐Cold War. Initially emerging as a bulwark against Western encroachment, the Asianism narrative became irrelevant upon Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 and only survived as a discourse about a glorified cultural past during colonial rule. Upon liberation, Asianism rescinded as the Japan‐centered regional order was replaced by a new Cold War alignment, capitalist (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) versus communist (China and North Korea). Although discussion about Asianism and a new East Asian regional order have recently resurfaced, the historical legacy of colonialism, war, and national division has added much complexity to the debate. Explicating how the Asianism narrative emerged and evolved through these various historical contexts sheds light on the complexities and difficulties inherent in the current attempt to forge an Asian regional order. By looking at Asianism from a historical perspective, we can also better appreciate the continuity and discontinuity in Korea's politics of identity. While it is still uncertain what the foundation of a new Asianism will be, it is equally obvious that regional interactions will continue to be an important part of the global world order. This study concludes with policy implications of how a historically sensitive understanding of the development of an Asian regional identity can further interaction and integration of East Asian nations. Keywords: AsianismNortheast Asian RegionalismIdentity Politicsthe Greater East Asian Co‐Prosperity SphereCivilization and EnlightenmentAsian Values Acknowledgment This paper was initially presented at a conference on 'Korea's Identities' at Yonsei University in Korea on 28–29 October 2004. The author appreciates the generous research support of the Yonsei Institute of Korean Studies and the Korea Research Foundation. Notes 1. During the Koryŏ period, for instance, Korean Buddhists actively participated in the Sinitic and Sino‐Indian world order (Buswell Citation1998), while during the Chosŏn dynasty, the Korean yangban elite identified with other East Asian literati (Duncan Citation1998). Still, these Korean Buddhists and yangban developed a separate and distinct identity within the larger cultural sphere, possessing a sense of distinctive territory and political community, if not the modern notion of nation. 2. I do not use 'East' or 'West' as any fixed empirical entity but rather as a metaphor to illustrate my arguments on Asianism or Easternism. I am fully aware that these are not fixed terms but historically contingent and socially constructed, and that this binary classification can offer oversimplified and even biased views of history and society. I still see their utility as metaphorical terms. 3. To be sure, persons such as Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901) took a different position, advocating 'dissociation from Asia' and adoption of Western civilization. See Yukichi (Citation1973). 4. Some Asianists felt betrayed and took radical action – like Ahn Chunggŭn who killed Itō, an early Japanese proponent of Asianism – while others accepted and even supported Japanese colonial rule. Still others did not entirely give up their dream and allied with Japanese Asianists to create their own utopian, anti‐Western polity called the Koryŏ (Gaoli) nation in 1920. Located in the Jiandao region between Manchuria and Korea, it was previously the heartland of the ancient Koguryŏ state (see Duara Citation2001). 5. There existed an equally powerful drive to distinguish Japan from its backward Asian colonies, displaying tensions with colonial assimilationist arguments. See Tanaka (Citation1993). 6. In Korea's Place in the Sun, Bruce Cumings vividly describes anti‐Japanism seen in North Korea as follows: 'Hardly a day goes by when the controlled press does not rant on about a fifty‐year‐old Japanese atrocity, or warn about the imminent revanche of Japanese militarism. The resistance to Japanese imperialism is still so prominent that one would think the war had just ended; many signs exhort citizens to "live in the way of the anti‐Japanese guerrillas," and young people go on camping trips that retrace their struggles' (Cumings Citation1997: 397). 7. Note that their advocacy of Asian values was also aimed at defending their authoritarian political systems. See a debate between Lee and DJ Kim of South Korea (published in Foreign Affairs in November/December 1994) over whether or not 'culture is destiny.' 8. Chŏnt'ong kwa hyŏndae ceased publishing in 2003. 9. Public polls show that 62 percent of South Koreans felt that the Bush speech characterizing North Korea as part of 'an axis of evil' was responsible for 'escalating tensions in the Korean peninsula.' Only 31 percent thought of it as a measured description of the North Korean threat. Also, only 24 percent of South Koreans 'favor the US war on terrorism' and 20 percent 'believe military action in Iraq [to be] justified.' See Larson and Levin (Citation2004). 10. The birth of the new journal Inter‐Asia Cultural Studies in 2000 reflects such new Asianist efforts. In the United States, a similar journal, positions: East Asia cultures critique, appeared in the early 1990s.
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Gi‐Wook Shin (2005) studied this question.
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