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This thesis critiques ethical neutrality in liberal political thought and proposes value-experimentalism as a foundation for democracy.

June 4, 2026Open Access

Democracy as Value-Experimentalism: A Deweyan Alternative to Ethical Neutrality

Key Points

This thesis critiques ethical neutrality in liberal political thought and proposes value-experimentalism as a foundation for democracy.
Critique of John Rawls' notion of ethical neutrality
Development of an alternative ethical framework based on John Dewey's pragmatism
Analysis of the implications of value-experimentalism for public institutions
Value-experimentalism emphasizes openness to contestation, enriching democratic legitimacy.
Grounded ethical judgments enhance the legitimacy of public institutions.
Proposes that a non-neutral stance can fulfill liberal freedom rather than threaten it.

Abstract

This thesis critiques the notion of "ethical neutrality" in liberal political thought, particularly that of John Rawls. Its primary intervention is to propose an alternative account of the ethical basis of liberal democracy, drawing on John Dewey's pragmatism. As opposed to adopting a stance of neutrality on matters of value, this approach, which I term value-experimentalism, grounds the legitimacy of public institutions - and the comprehensive ethical judgments which they necessarily involve - on their openness to ongoing contestation. I conclude by defending this view as a fulfillment of, not a threat to liberal freedom.

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