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This philosophical exploration challenges the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge using counterfactuals.
Metaphysical modalities are definable from counterfactual conditionals, and the epistemology of the former is a special case of the epistemology of the latter. In particular, the role of conceivability and inconceivability in assessing claims of possibility and impossibility can be explained as a special case of the pervasive role of the imagination in assessing counterfactual conditionals, an account of which is sketched. Thus scepticism about metaphysical modality entails a more far-reaching scepticism about counterfactuals. The account is used to question the significance of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge.
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Timothy Williamson (2007) studied this question.
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