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Japan’s announcement of its counterstrike doctrine through its National Security Strategy, 2022, has been widely regarded as marking a paradigm shift in the country’s post–Second World War posturing in international affairs. The doctrine, which lays down a legal basis for Japan’s self-defence forces to strike enemy territories to neutralise imminent threats, has evolved in response to changing threat perception since the Cold War decades. This article attempts to situate Japan’s national security policymaking and the recent formulation of the counterstrike doctrine within its threat perception. It identifies the counterstrike doctrine primarily as a tactical response to missile threats from China, Russia and North Korea, to allow Japan to ensure survival on its own accord. It further delves into an analysis of full-spectrum capabilities that Japan needs to operationalise counterstrike while situating the same within threat perception. It concludes that counterstrike in the long term can evolve to become the mainstay of Japan’s efforts to emerge as an autonomous actor of significance in the security sphere.
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Anupama Vijayakumar (2025) studied this question.
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