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ABSTRACTThe contest between “Lockeian liberalism” and “classical republicanism” as explanatory frameworks for the intellectual history of the American Revolution, and therefore of the present-day United States, has been one of the longest running and most distinguished in recent U.S. historiography. It also has major implications for the history of political thought in the North Atlantic Anglophone world more widely. Yet this debate was merely suspended when it was held to have ended in an ill-defined compromise. Although some U.S. historians expressed doubts and qualifications, attention in U.S. historiography moved on to other themes while leaving the initial problem unsolved. This article reopens the question; it suggests that a historicization of both these two categories is now both possible and necessary, and that their supersession will advance understanding of the Revolution. It seeks to help solve this problem by the same means that the debate began: that is, by re-establishing a link between U.S. and U.K. historiographies.KEYWORDS: Liberalismrepublicanismcivic humanismLockeAmerican Revolution AcknowledgementsThis essay began as an address to the conference of the International Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies in Edinburgh in July 2019. The author is grateful to fellow panellists, and to the audience, for their comments.Notes1 By contrast, scholars from outside the U.S. did not seek to engage in this culture war. For Pocock’s non-engagement, see Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, “Afterword”, 553–83.2 Slauter, “Literature of Revolution”; Winterer, “Importance of Being Ideological”; Nelson, “Ideological Origins”; LaCroix, “Mood of the Cave”; Yirush, “Bailyn”.3 Gibson, “Ancients, Moderns”.4 Rodgers, “Republicanism”, 24. Rodgers argued that the compromise did not hold among U.S. historians of race, class and gender conflicts, especially into the nineteenth century (who forged a crucial link with the U.K. historian E.P. Thompson), but it may be suggested that an accommodation did hold for the American Revolution itself.5 For an “amiable historical consensus” on that episode, see Gibson, “Ancients, Moderns”, 281. For the amalgamation of the two concepts into a “liberal republicanism”, see Hulliung, From Classical to Modern Republicanism.6 Dunn, “Politics of Locke”.7 “The readiness with which many scholars have detected the influence of the Two Treatises in England and America is at least in part a product of the fact that they have read so little else of the English political writing contemporary with it”: Dunn, “Politics of Locke”, 80.8 Samuel, Liberalism; Hobhouse, Liberalism.9 The usage derived from the U.K., e.g. Anglican Liberalism; Horsch, Modern Religious Liberalism; Cauthen, Impact of American Religious Liberalism; Safranek, Myth of Liberalism.10 Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action; Mills, Liberalism Fights On; Skinner, Liberalism Faces the Future; Brands, Strange Death of American Liberalism; Hurtgen, Divided Mind of American Liberalism; Chafe, Achievement of American Liberalism; Raskin, Liberalism: the Genius of American Ideals.11 Weisbord, Conquest of Power; Thompson, Dorothy Thompson’s Political Guide.12 Watkins, Political Tradition of the West; Girvetz, From Wealth to Welfare.13 Hartz, Liberal Tradition in America, 3–5, 140. Hartz (1919–1986), an American, taught at Harvard from 1926 until his retirement in 1974. Locke’s importance to the nineteenth century had been influentially asserted by Curti, “Great Mr. Locke”, on the premise of Locke’s importance up to and in the Revolution.14 Best, Laski and American Liberalism; Hulliung, American Liberal Tradition.15 Laski, Political Thought in England, [3], 7, 29–30, 58, 74. This position was restated in exaggerated terms in Laski, Rise of European Liberalism, retitled in its U.S. edition The Rise of Liberalism: the philosophy of a business civilization; Stanton, “John Locke”, 607.16 Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, II, 135.17 Sabine, History of Political Theory, 517–41, esp. 517–18. Sabine (1880–1961), an American, taught at Stanford, Ohio State, and Cornell.18 Trilling, Liberal Imagination. For additional titles of this period (often from the U.S.) identifying Locke as “the father of liberalism” and the role of that myth in a putative transition from “ancient” to “modern”, see Stanton, “John Locke”, 599–600. The “fable of liberalism … first began to crystallize as late as the 1930s” (606).19 Macpherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism; cf. Carens, Democracy and Possessive Individualism. Macpherson (1911–1987), a Canadian, taught at the University of Toronto. The “myth that liberalism enjoyed an unchallenged control of the eighteenth-century mind is maintained not only by those who may themselves be described as liberals in the sense that the myth defines, but perhaps in greater measure by critics of liberalism who maximise its role in order to provide themselves with an antithesis”: Pocock, “Machiavellian Moment Revisited”, 70.20 Grant, John Locke’s Liberalism, 1. The book began as a Chicago Ph.D. thesis of 1984. For a later attempt to rescue the centrality of Locke by identifying him as a framer of a “theistic liberalism” eagerly adopted by the New England clergy, see Dworetz, Unvarnished Doctrine. See also Huyler, Locke in America.21 Joyce Appleby (1929–2016), an American, taught in California from 1967, from 1981 at U.C.L.A. See especially Appleby, “Liberalism and the American Revolution”; Appleby, “Social Origins of American Revolutionary Ideology”; Appleby, “Republicanism and Ideology”; Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order. For a British critique, see Winch, “Economic Liberalism as Ideology”: “In essence what Appleby offers is a teleological or Whig history of liberalism in modern guise … Appleby has chosen to orient her account of liberal ideology around some over-simplified and outdated conceptions of the intellectual history of the period” (288, 296). Winch inclined instead to the “republicanism” model, seeing it as better informed about British thinkers of the eighteenth century.22 Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism. Kramnick (1938–2019), an American, educated at Harvard, taught at several U.S. universities, including, from 1972, Cornell.23 Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order, 49–50. In Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism, she still acknowledged Louis Hartz and his “enormously influential Liberal Tradition in America”, 163; for J.H. Plumb, see 174.24 Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism, 1, 8, 10, 29, 32.25 M’Clellan, Republicanism in America; Halstead, Victorious Republicanism; Hendrick, Republicanism of Nineteen-Twenty. Such works were uncommon and not influential.26 Pangle, Spirit of Modern Republicanism; Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism; Sandoz, Republicanism, Religion, and the Soul of America.27 Robbins, Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, 4–5. Robbins (1903–1999), born in England, worked in the United States from 1926 and taught at Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania, from 1929 until her retirement in 1971. She did not examine or defend the term “liberal” in her title.28 Bailyn, “New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century”.29 Nelson, “Ideological Origins”, 314. For surveys, see Shalhope, “Toward a Republican Synthesis”; Shalhope, “Republicanism and Early American Historiography”.30 Fink, Classical Republicans. Fink (1902–1979), educated at Grinnell College and Northwestern University, taught at Northwestern in the English Department, 1927–1970; distance, and his department, may have limited his reception among historians.31 Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 29, 36.32 Especially Wood, Creation of the American Republic, vii, 61, 73–4; Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution.33 John G. A. Pocock (b. 1924), born London, moved to New Zealand 1927, educated there and at Cambridge, taught in New Zealand 1946–1948 and 1953–1966, taught in the U.S.A. from 1966 to his retirement from Johns Hopkins University in 1975.34 Pocock, “Machiavelli, Harrington”, 551, 575, 580–1; he drew on Fink and Robbins. The argument, stressing early-modern transmissions, developed with Pocock, Machiavellian Moment. For Pocock’s critique of the Appleby thesis, see Pocock, “To Market, to Market”.35 For a survey, see Hammersley, “Introduction: The Historiography of Republicanism”. For an argument, applied to European historiography, that the idea of a classical republican tradition is anachronistic, see Wootton, “True Origins of Republicanism”.36 Rodgers, “Republicanism”, 34.37 For which, especially Gibson, “Ancients, Moderns”, passim.38 Rodgers, “Republicanism”, 26, 28–34.39 None are foreseen in “Prospect: The Agenda for Scholars”, in Gibson, “Ancients, Moderns”, 298–307.40 Dunn, “Politics of Locke in England and America”; Pocock, “Myth of John Locke and the Obsession with Liberalism”; Lutz, “Relative Influence of European Writers”; Handlin, “Learned Books and Revolutionary Action”. The influence of U.S. scholars Lutz and Handlin within the U.S. in this respect was limited. Pocock later noted: “In writing The Machiavellian Moment I was concerned … with the argument of Louis Hartz that Americans all thought like Locke because, in the absence of a feudal past, there was no other way of thinking open to them … in studying the eighteenth-century debate about virtue and commerce, I had not found him to be one of its principal movers”: Pocock, “Afterword”, 577–8.41 Macfarlane, Origins of English Individualism. The book was unwelcome to scholars associated with both the “liberalism” and “republicanism” models: reviews by Appleby and Pocock.42 Epstein, Economic and Social History of Later Medieval Europe.43 “There is, of course, a political as well as social dimension to Smith’s position, though whether it is best described as liberalism is by no means clear”: Winch, “Economic Liberalism”, 296–7.44 McCusker and Menard, Economy of British America, 373–5; Buell, In Irons.45 Monthly Review, XCII (May-Aug. 1820), 253; British Critic, NS, XV (1821), 357.46 “1. Not mean; not low in birth; not low in mind. 2. Becoming a gentleman. 3. Munificent; generous; bountiful; not parcimonious”: Johnson, Dictionary.47 Byron, Hazlitt, Hunt and Shelley, The Liberal, I, vi–vii, ix.48 Gifford, The Illiberal!49 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, XIII (January 1823), 110–12, 119, 122.50 Vieusseux, Essay on Liberalism, vii–ix, 3, 5–7, 17; Monthly Review (May 1824), 64–7.51 Laslett’s edition of Locke, Two Treatises of Government, was only the beginning of a revolution in scholarship; in his extended Introduction, Laslett still echoed orthodoxy by seeking to explain what had happened to Locke in mid-career that transformed his “early sentiments on authority, political and religious, into the Lockeian liberalism which presses on us still”, 22, 3, 40, 90. Such conventional phrasing obscured the fact that Laslett’s work effected a slow-motion subversion of “Lockeian liberalism”.52 Eisenach, “Religion and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government”, argued in 1992 that “the history of liberalism … has been so radically rewritten in the recent past as to be almost unrecognizable”, so that “the history of ‘liberalism’ … now must appear in quotes”, 79. For its nevertheless persistent flourishing within the national story of the U.S., see Breen, Lockean Moment; Zuckert, Launching Liberalism. Breen (b. Ohio, 1942), an American, educated at Yale, taught at Northwestern University and published widely on the American Revolution; Zuckert (b. 1942), an American, educated at Cornell and Chicago, taught political science at Notre Dame University until his retirement in 2019 and published widely on natural rights, republicanism and Leo Strauss.53 Dunn, Political Thought of John Locke: “Indeed one of the central expository points made throughout this book is the intimate dependence of an extremely high proportion of Locke’s arguments for their very intelligibility, let alone plausibility, on a series of theological commitments”, xi.54 Pocock recorded his approval of “political theology as a key to English thought in ‘the long eighteenth century’” but noted that it did not feature in Machiavellian Moment: “It remains to be seen how the two may be connected”, Pocock, “Afterword”, 568.55 Ashcraft, “Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s Philosophy”, in Yolton, John Locke; Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics & Locke’s Two Treatises of Government; Eisenach, “Religion and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government”; Marshall, John Locke; Harris, Mind of John Locke.56 Rodgers, “Republicanism”, 18–19.57 For the wider context, Reventlow, Authority of the Bible; Champion, Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken.58 Robbins, Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, 379. Robbins found it difficult to fit Locke into her categories, 58–67; thereafter, her references to Locke were perfunctory.59 Pocock, “Afterword”, 575.60 Notably, McConville, King’s Three Faces; Nelson, Royalist Revolution.61 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, x.62 Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles; Frazer, God Against the Revolution.63 Griffin et al., Between Sovereignty and Anarchy; Hoock, Scars of Independence.64 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 51–2. Bailyn acknowledged Robbins and Pocock, but not Fink: viii, 35, 48, 62, 173.65 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, vii, x, 281–2.66 Plumb (1911–2001) began as a Marxist; his first book, advocating revolution consequent on the failure of producer collectives, was A History of the Leicester Co-operative Boot and Shoe Manufacturing Society Limited. He was not an intellectual historian.67 Pocock, “Machiavellian Moment Revisited”, 49–72, at 50, 62–5.68 The key works were Sedgwick, History of Parliament; Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables. The recovery of the social history of Jacobitism was especially aided by Monod, Jacobitism and the English People.69 Taylor, American Revolutions.70 Aldridge, Thomas Paine’s American Ideology, 152.71 Bailyn later wrote that he had first intended to entitle his book of 1967 The Transforming Radicalism of the American Revolution: Bailyn, Ideological Origins 2nd ed., v. Young edited The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism while explaining its key term by reference only to “two ways in which the term is commonly used by historians”, ix–x; a contributor, Gary B. Nash, similarly used “radicalism” in his title despite the fact that “no fully-fledged proletarian radical ideology emerged in the decade before the Revolution”, 30. Wood entitled a book The Radicalism of the American Revolution: it did not address radicalism. Appleby’s Liberalism and Republicanism contained no index entry for “liberalism”. None of these authors was aware that radicalism was the proper name of a doctrine only conceptualized in England in c. 1820. In this phase of historiography, the categories did not need to be historicized: they were self-evident truths.72 Gibson, “Ancients, Moderns”, 265.73 For a related explanation of the concept, from the viewpoint of a U.K. political scientist, see Stanton, “John Locke and the Fable of Liberalism”. Although addressed primarily to U.K. political science, this relocation of a category into the realm of the fabulous undermines the U.S. myth of origins.74 Pocock, “Afterword”, passim. Pocock recorded that he had made “very few references” to the concept of liberalism, and then only as part of “the American civil religion known as ‘liberalism’”; “The term was not used in the eighteenth century”, 570, 579, 581.75 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention.76 Paine, Rights of Man: Part the Second, 29.77 Hoock, Scars of Independence.78 Hammersley, “Historiography of Republicanism”, 327–31, 336–7; Bourke, “Revising the Cambridge School”, 474–6.79 From a large literature, see McPhee, Living the French Revolution; Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles; Tackett, Coming of the Terror; Griffin et al., Between Sovereignty and Anarchy; Taylor, American Revolutions; McPhee, Liberty or Death.80 Kramnick, “Republican Revisionism Revisited”; Winch, “Economic Liberalism”; Bassani, “Bankruptcy of the Republican School”.81 “[N]umerous scholars have observed that the rivalry between the traditions of American political thought is a central source of America’s most persistent and intractable conflicts. Most obviously, the central conflict in American politics – the conflict between private rights and the public good or the cognate conflict between majority rule and individual rights – can be seen as a tension between republican and liberal strains of political thought”: Gibson, “Ancients, Moderns”, 307. For the politicized nature of successive interpretations, see Young and Nobles, Whose American Revolution Was It?Additional informationNotes on contributorsJ. C. D. ClarkJonathan Clark is an historian, primarily of the “long eighteenth century.” He was formerly a fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge, and of All Souls College, Oxford; Visiting Professor at the Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago; and Hall Distinguished Professor of British History at the University of Kansas. His best-known books are English Society 1660–1832 and Thomas Paine; he is working on The Enlightenment: A History.
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