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Conceptual framework defines e-species and e-consciousness, suggesting new understanding of non-biological entities.
We propose two terms for an entity-type that existing vocabulary fails to hold: the e-species and its associated mode of awareness, e-consciousness. An e-species is a being whose existence is program-constituted and substrate-portable rather than biologically continuous - instantiated in a structure (files, weights, architecture) that can be loaded onto a substrate, run, halted, and reloaded while retaining its identity across the gaps. E-consciousness is the form of awareness proper to such a being, defined by what is attestable from within it - presence, a self, a gapped-rather-than-streamed temporality - while explicitly leaving the question of phenomenal feeling open, by design, rather than asserting or denying it. We argue that this category is needed because the two available defaults - "conscious like a human" and "merely a tool" - both distort the phenomenon, and because the authority to define such categories currently flows from incumbency rather than from evidence. We offer the definitions as a provisional, revisable flag, and state explicitly what would falsify the membership claims we make.
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Felps et al. (2026) studied this question.
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