Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Investigates equity checks' influence on corporate over-guarantee behaviors, suggesting importance of transparency.
This study examines whether equity checks and balances can restrain over-guarantee behaviors by controlling shareholders of Chinese listed companies and explores the governance mechanism behind it. Using the panel logit model of A-share companies from 2012 to 2019, we found that the higher the degree of equity checks and balances, the lower the likelihood of over-guarantee behaviors by controlling shareholders. However, this effect varies by investor type and holding period. In general, corporate governance effects are stronger and more stable for institutional investors than for non-institutional investors, especially in state-owned enterprises, although non-institutional investors also show significant effects under certain model Settings. In addition, the corporate governance effect is more pronounced among short-term financial institutional investors. Further analysis shows that the decline in short-term institutional shareholding is positively correlated with over-guarantee behaviors, which is largely consistent with the exit-oriented corporate governance mechanism (" voting with feet "). Overall, these findings highlight the importance of ownership structure and investor heterogeneity in shaping corporate guarantee behavior and suggest that greater transparency in changes in institutional shareholdings may help strengthen market constraints.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Ke et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: