Does oversight structure matter for restraining police use of force and enhancing public legitimacy? Disconfirmatory case studies on South Korea, Ontario (Canada), and South Africa

Independent civilian police oversight is often hailed as the best alternative to internal oversight and a necessary component of “democratic policing.” However, it remains unclear whether these systems have actually produced the changes they promise, such as reducing police use of force, improving accountability, strengthening public trust, and increasing confidence in both police and oversight institutions. Growing global calls to defund, detask, or abolish the police reflect declining public confidence in oversight systems as symbols of democratic accountability. This study questions that assumption by examining three contrasting cases: South Korea, which relied mainly on internal oversight; Ontario (Canada), which used decentralized independent oversight mechanisms; and South Africa, which adopted a centralized independent oversight model. The study argues that meaningful change depends less on claims of “independence,” and more on whether accountability mechanisms operate effectively in practice and produce measurable improvements in police conduct, institutional accountability, and public trust.