What question did this study set out to answer?

The research aims to understand the economic institutions governing tax-farming contracts in the Ottoman Empire and their effects on organization.

Tax farming as business: Contracts, cooperation, and the absence of corporate organization in the Ottoman Empire (1550–1800)

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Examines tax-farming contracts in the Ottoman Empire, revealing implications for business organization.

The research aims to understand the economic institutions governing tax-farming contracts in the Ottoman Empire and their effects on organization.
Utilized institutional and game-theoretic frameworks for analysis.
Examined strategic interactions between the state and agents under weak commitment.
Compared Ottoman practices to Western Europe's corporate fiscal entities.
Individualized short-term contracts resulted in low efficiency equilibrium.
The absence of corporate organization limited administrative capacity investment.
The study clarifies the paradox of traditional Islamic practices versus institutional design in the Ottoman context.

Altay et al. (2026) studied this question.

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