Non‐Naturalist Realism and Quietist Constructivism

Metaethical quietists propose views that share all the features of robust non‐naturalist realism, such as a commitment to cognitivism and irreducibly normative truths, except robust realist non‐naturalists' commitment to non‐natural properties. In this paper I propose a version of quietism which holds that true first‐order claims about practical reasons are made true by being the conclusion of the best reasoning process about what practical reasons there are but true claims about what is the best reasoning process about normative practical reasons are not made true by either non‐natural properties or natural properties. I call this view Quietist Constructivism (QC). I first argue that QC gives quietists the resources to explain why there are no non‐natural properties but there are non‐natural truths. I then explain how QC may give non‐naturalists the resources to solve two of the most significant problems that non‐naturalists face. I argue that QC has important resources that seem to enable it to solve the reliability and supervenience problems for non‐naturalism in ways that robust realist non‐naturalism and non‐constructivist quietism cannot. Finally, I discuss some challenges that QC faces and argue that it seems that they can be overcome.