Defining a Characteristic Stimulus of a Disposition

The first step philosophers normally take when they discuss dispositions is to introduce the notions of a characteristic stimulus and manifestation of a disposition D. But we will see below that this very first step is fraught with pitfalls and problems. Though philosophers haven't given an explicit characterization of a characteristic stimulus of D, they implicitly appeal to the thought that a characteristic stimulus of D is an event‐type that typically serves as a proximate cause of D's manifestation. So understood, dispositions will be found to have far more characteristic stimuli than they are ordinarily thought to have. In this paper, however, I will present a characterization of a characteristic stimulus of D that is not only theoretically better motivated but delivers more commonsensical rulings in specific examples than the one that philosophers have implicitly accepted. I will go on to argue that, once this characterization is put in place, we can contain the wild proliferation of characteristic stimuli of dispositions.