Advanced semiconductors are foundational to the operational effectiveness of modern U.S. defense systems. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) remains structurally dependent on geographically concentrated foreign fabrication—particularly advanced-node production in Taiwan—and upstream material inputs subject to geopolitical constraint. This dependency creates systemic vulnerability within defense acquisition governance rather than isolated procurement inefficiency. This dissertation examined the strategic implications of concentrated and outsourced semiconductor supply chains within U.S. defense acquisition. It addressed three research questions: (1) To what extent does U.S. semiconductor dependency pose national security risk? (2) How do policymakers and defense industry leaders perceive geopolitical uncertainty within semiconductor markets and (3) What governance and procurement strategies can enhance resilience? Using a two-study qualitative design, the research integrated Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Six Sigma DMAIC framework to evaluate governance constraints and operational control gaps. Study 1 analyzed the F-35 program as a critical case using semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis of GAO, CRS, and DoD reports. Study 2 extended the analysis across missile defense and related acquisition systems to assess ecosystem-level generalizability. Data were coded using NVivo through a hybrid theoretical and inductive approach. Findings indicate that semiconductor vulnerability is systemic within defense acquisition architecture. High asset specificity, supplier concentration, institutional rigidity, and geopolitical uncertainty interact to produce structural inertia, limiting adaptive capacity. Strengthening defense semiconductor resilience therefore requires coordinated reform across procurement governance, industrial policy, and supply chain transparency.
John Sarfo (Thu,) studied this question.