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This essay critiques Jurjako's naturalistic subjectivism regarding normative reasons, suggesting alternative clarity.
In Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View, Marko Jurjako takes on the philosophical challenge, as his title intimates, of reconciling the existence of normative reasons with a naturalistic worldview. In this essay, I raise two objections to Jurjako’s positive naturalistic, subjectivist, idealized agent account of normative reasons. First, a simpler, more elegant form of subjectivism is able, I argue, to resolve the puzzle that drives Jurjako to idealized agent subjectivism. Second, I argue that Jurako’s realist opponent has substantive grounds for concluding that Jurako doesn’t truly address the particular intuitions (about the phenomenology of normative life) that best motivate normative realism. In the process of raising these objections, I attempt to clarify the basic theoretical commitments of realism, constructivism, and subjectivism about normative reasons.
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Regan Lance Reitsma (2026) studied this question.
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