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Game theory examines taxpayer venue decisions in IRS disputes, suggesting implications for legal strategies.
Taxpayers unwilling to settle disputes with the IRS administratively must choose among several venues in order to defend their interests. This study examines the taxpayer's choice of venue from a game theory perspective. We describe the litigation process as a two-player game with asymmetric information, where taxpayers have private information as to their guilt or innocence. The IRS offers to settle out of court and taxpayers can either accept or reject this settlement demand. We find that the optimal IRS settlement demand depends upon the ability of the courts to discriminate between the guilty and the innocent, as well as upon the out-of-pocket legal costs of the players. Further, venue choice is never an informative signal when the IRS' goal is to maximize expected revenue. When minimization of expected incremental social costs is the IRS' objective function, the taxpayer's venue choice may in some cases transfer information to the IRS.
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Eynon et al. (1995) studied this question.
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