Thermal-Renewable Coordination Under the “Two Joint Operations” Policy: A Network-Weighted Cooperative Game Approach

The “Two Joint Operations” policy aims to promote coordinated development between thermal power and renewable energy through institutional incentives and constraints. Under this framework, government participation significantly affects cooperative relationships and benefit realization among energy enterprises. To analyze this coordination mechanism, this study constructs a tripartite cooperative game model involving the government, thermal power enterprises, and renewable energy enterprises. Social Network Analysis (SNA) is introduced to characterize inter-agent cooperative structures, while network centrality indicators are incorporated into key parameters such as coordination efficiency, renewable energy integration capability, and institutional execution efficiency. Furthermore, the Shapley value method is structurally weighted based on network relationships to reflect differences in participants’ actual roles within the coordination system. The results indicate that embedding social network analysis (SNA) structures can effectively release the synergistic effects of institutional optimization and policy coordination, enhance system coordination efficiency, and promote a steady increase in total coalition payoff with a stable positive response pattern. Both thermal power and renewable energy enterprises benefit from the coordination improvement, while renewable energy entities exhibit higher sensitivity, indicating significant heterogeneity in agent responses. The government’s payoff remains generally stable across scenarios. Parameter analysis further verifies that the model demonstrates good structural stability and mechanism robustness. By introducing a network-structure-based analytical perspective, this study provides a potential reference for related research.