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Roughly one quarter of the world’s wild fish harvests are regulated through an individual quota system with some degree of tradability. Why have states in a huge variety of circumstances across the world chosen market-based solutions to challenges of resource administration? This article considers two case studies: post-communist Russia, where individual quotas allocated via auction were instituted in some of the country’s most valuable fisheries in the Far East in 2001 and post-authoritarian Peru that switched to a limited transferable individual quota system as a means of administering the anchoveta in 2008. While individual quota regimes are frequently touted for their economic efficiency, this was only one of many goals Russian and Peruvian leaders intended to achieve with their implementation, and not necessarily the primary one. Instead, individual quotas provided solutions to political problems such as recentralising power and responding to regulatory challenges in the context of a weak presidency. In both cases, the implementation of individual quotas was aided by the fact that they were framed in a technocratic language that suggested they were apolitical. This allowed state leaders to undertake new policies that extended state authority.
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Gregory Ferguson‐Cradler (2026) studied this question.
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