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This article presents counterexamples to refined existentialism in perceptual awareness, indicating weaknesses in its accuracy.
Particularism is the position that perceptual content is essentially singular, and all perceptual representations are as of particulars: I see that cat. Existentialism is the position that all perceptual representations are as of general features, not particulars, which are satisfied when the world would satisfy the corresponding existentially quantified statement: I see there as being a cat. H. P. Grice famously raised the problem that existential contents could fail to refer to the particulars which made them accurate, such as when a mirror is placed in front of an object that reflects a qualitatively identical object in a different location. Christopher Hill and Mark Sainsbury have recently proposed refinements to existentialism that resolve Grice’s problem, by adding a causal condition for perceptual awareness of a particular. In this article, I describe three counterexamples to this refined existentialism, from the wagon wheel effect, misperceptions of continuity, and misperceptions of seamless transition. Particularism correctly judges these to be cases of hallucination as of a particular, whereas existentialism misjudges these cases to be accurate perceptions of a particular, since a cause of the perceptual experience satisfies the existential content.
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Jeffrey J. Watson (2026) studied this question.
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