Digital policy has become an important instrument for promoting sustainable agricultural modernization. However, its effectiveness depends on the strategic responses of the government, agricultural operators, and farmers. This study develops a theoretical framework to examine how digital policy affects sustainable agricultural modernization through multi-agent interaction. Specifically, it constructs a three-party evolutionary game model and a Stackelberg game model to analyze strategy evolution under different implementation costs, subsidies, and penalties, as well as the government’s first-mover role in subsidy design. The results show that digital policy does not promote sustainable agricultural modernization through a simple linear pathway. Instead, it operates by reshaping the incentive structures of agricultural operators and farmers. Lower government implementation costs increase the likelihood of active policy implementation, while subsidies for agricultural operators and farmers strengthen their willingness to adopt digital tools, engage in standardized production, and participate in digital agricultural activities. However, the marginal effect of subsidies weakens as participation and digitalization increase, indicating that unlimited subsidy expansion may reduce policy efficiency and increase fiscal pressure. This study contributes to the literature by linking digital policy design, multi-agent strategic interaction, and sustainable agricultural modernization within a unified theoretical framework. It highlights that effective digital agricultural policy requires incentive compatibility, fiscal sustainability, inclusive participation, and adaptive governance, rather than reliance solely on digital technology investment or subsidy expansion.
Qi et al. (Tue,) studied this question.