This analysis critiques Laclau's theories on populism and its implications for agency and leadership in groups.
In On Populist Reason , Ernesto Laclau takes Freud as his point of departure to argue that populism is not a pathological form of democracy, but its intrinsic rationality and possibility, and already embedded in democratic practices, ideals, and struggles. I delineate three of Laclau's Freudian premises and identify limitations or flaws in his appropriation. In distinguishing between a primary populism and a secondary populism, I argue that both Laclau's conception of symbolic representation and his presentation of the leader's role in group psychology fall prey to a version of sovereign loyalty that undermines independent agency and judgment.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Emily Zakin (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: