The beneficial owner of a corporation holds a unique legal status balancing the right to receive corporate information against the strict obligation to disclose personal and structural data. This article analyzes the rationale and conditions for granting informational rights to beneficial owners, particularly when obtaining such data from nominee participants is impossible. Concurrently, it examines the legal consequences of their counter-obligation to disclose information to third parties. Through an analysis of judicial practice, the author defines the scope of accessible corporate documents and outlines the specific rules governing information disclosure within corporate groups and subsidiaries. While disclosure typically occurs through beneficial ownership registers, this study evaluates international best practices and systemic challenges, including the tension between confidentiality and public registries. Ultimately, the author addresses the core asymmetry between the conditional nature of informational rights and the mandatory nature of disclosure obligations. To balance private and public interests, the article proposes the implementation of non-public registers of beneficial owners as a regulatory solution.
Viktor Gorbachuk (Tue,) studied this question.