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This article demonstrates structural coordination failures in digital trade agreements in Korea, suggesting institutional remedies.
States are concluding digital trade agreements faster than they can assess whether the resulting obligations will be complied with at home, and the reason lies not in political will or administrative capacity but in the agreements' structural design. Unlike conventional trade instruments, a single provision on data flows or computing facility localization simultaneously penetrates data protection law, financial regulation, and cybersecurity certification—domains administered by bodies institutionally distinct from the trade—policy function that negotiated the obligations. Existing compliance theory does not anticipate this failure: its incentive mechanisms presuppose a state acting as a coherent implementing principal, a presupposition that digital trade agreements dissolve by distributing implementation across bodies with every reason to prioritize their own mandates over treaty compliance. This Article develops the concept of structural coordination failure and demonstrates its operation through the Korea—Singapore Digital Partnership Agreement (KSDPA). Korea—a high—capacity, rule—of—law state concluding its first standalone comprehensive digital trade agreement—is precisely the case in which existing theory would most confidently predict success. Three legally distinct tensions between KSDPA obligations and Korean regulatory law each disables a different compliance incentive through a predictable structural mechanism; comparative analysis across the EU, India, and Singapore indicates these failures are a property of the agreement type rather than the implementing jurisdiction. Three remedies follow: mandatory pre—negotiation compliance auditing across affected regulatory bodies; active deployment of treaty cooperation clauses as compliance management instruments rather than diplomatic boilerplate; and domestic regulatory review as a formal precondition for ratification consent.
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Kim et al. (2026) studied this question.
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