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Despite the global autocratization wave, there is a limited understanding of how bilateral engagement is used to constrain autocrats. This study begins to fill that gap by examining whether and how U.S. security cooperation is employed to counter autocratizing actions. We propose a framework arguing that the effectiveness of security cooperation as an influence lever is conditioned by three features of the relationship: the breadth of its policy design, the degree of institutional coordination, and the nature of its funding model. We explore this framework through a study of U.S. responses to autocratization episodes in El Salvador (2019-2023), drawing on interviews with U.S. officials and security assistance data. We find that while security cooperation was employed as a tool to counter Bukele’s autocratization efforts, the established framework significantly undermined the signal’s strength. A narrow policy focus, weak institutional coordination, and a funding model characterized by both structural inflexibility and historical volatility diluted the U.S. response, undermining its effectiveness as an influence tool. The study contributes to our understanding of the conditions that shape the utility of bilateral engagement for influencing domestic political behaviour.
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Giusti-Rodríguez et al. (2026) studied this question.
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