The strategic matching between manufacturers and streamers in live-streaming e-commerce

Purpose This paper investigates how manufacturers with different market bases should strategically match with a high- or low-influence streamer in live-streaming e-commerce. It aims to reveal how horizontal asymmetry in market size and vertical asymmetry in pricing power jointly shape optimal cooperation strategies and profit outcomes. Design/methodology/approach A game-theoretic model is developed featuring two asymmetric manufacturers choosing between two types of streamers. Four cooperation scenarios are analyzed under a two-stage game structure, where the pricing party differs based on streamer influence. Closed-form equilibrium are derived under linear demand. Optimal prices and profits are compared across different scenarios. Findings Our analysis shows that the equilibrium price when cooperating with a high-influence streamer is higher than the price when cooperating with a low-influence streamer. Moreover, the large manufacturer does not always charge higher than the small manufacturer. Manufacturers' strategic cooperation choices depend on the commission rate of the high-influence streamer and the relative influence gap between the two streamers. When the rate is low and the gap is large, both manufacturers prefer the high-influence streamer. As the commission rate increases or the influence gap narrows, manufacturers begin to shift to the low-influence streamer based on cost–benefit trade-offs. Originality/value This study offers a novel framework integrating dual asymmetries (market base and pricing power) into the live-streaming supply chain literature. It provides strategic insights for manufacturers on effective streamer collaboration and pricing delegation in digital retail environments.