Can ecolabels survive climate uncertainty? A game-theoretic perspective on fishery certification

The informative role of ecolabels has been extensively analyzed; however, the impact of uncertain environmental conditions on certification has been overlooked. This paper investigates the signaling role of fishery certification considering the strategic interaction between a fisherman seeking certification and an uniformed monitoring authority. We develop a signaling game that identifies informative (separating) and uninformative (pooling) equilibria. Our results show that intermediate certification costs, higher expected profit gains from certification, and greater probability of unfavorable environmental conditions can promote information transmission, thereby reducing the reliance on direct monitoring. Additionally, we examine the effects of asymmetric certification costs and subsidies on our findings. We show that the former (latter) can deter (promote) the emergence of an uninformative equilibrium, thus making monitoring less (more, respectively) necessary. These findings offer guidance for designing adaptive regulatory frameworks that align certification incentives with environmental risks.