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The establishment of a centralised anti-corruption institution has long been considered an effective strategy for curbing corruption in developing countries. With a focus on China, this paper investigates the mechanism underlying such an institutional arrangement. To combat corruption in the country, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has centralised the procedures for nominating local disciplinary officials. This paper examines the effectiveness of this institutional change by analysing an original dataset of disciplinary leaders and cases of anti-corruption investigations in 31 provincial-level divisions in China. Results show that the number of native officials has continued to decline in the discipline inspection system since the late 1980s, due to the CPC’s growing willingness and capacity to constrain local political networks by assigning non-native officials to critical local Party positions. This paper further finds that non-native disciplinary leaders, as well as those born native but with weaker local connections, tend to launch more investigations into corrupt Party cadres in their provinces. These findings suggest that weakened local embeddedness of disciplinary bureaucrats is conducive to improving their performance in anti-corruption investigations, an effect most likely to be achieved in a strong state like China.
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Yang Zhang (2026) studied this question.
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