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Compared with listed companies, urban investment platforms (UIPs) demonstrate weaker standardization and timeliness in information disclosure, making their audit risks a subject of concern. This study selects UIPs from 2017 to 2024 as the research sample to explore the motivations and consequences of their proactive abrupt auditor changes. The findings reveal that UIPs are more likely to change accounting firms between January and April of the year they issue urban investment bonds, with more delayed timing and weaker objectivity in stated reasons for the change. In other words, the issuance of such bonds exacerbates the phenomenon of “proactive abrupt auditor changes.” These changes are motivated by UIPs’ attempts to “disguise” low profitability to meet the financial thresholds for bond issuance. Consequently, proactive abrupt auditor changes are more prevalent when UIPs operate under local governments with heavy urban investment debt burdens, face debt refinancing pressure, or exhibit higher levels of earnings management. Further research shows that UIPs experiencing “proactive abrupt auditor changes” are more likely to encounter credit risk events in the same year, and such changes provide a more effective early warning signal for credit risks than credit ratings or credit spreads.
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Chen et al. (2026) studied this question.
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