Transformative Enactive Personalism

Transformative Enactive Personalism (TEP) offers a process-relational account of how living organisms can become sentient subjects, persons, and moral agents without reducing personhood to biological regulation or introducing a second substance. The theory combines process monism with organizational pluralism: metabolic, affective, semantic, personal, and institutional organizations remain materially continuous while possessing distinct identity, correctness, and persistence conditions. Sentience is treated as an integrated, affectively manifest mode of self-relation rather than a consequence of autopoiesis alone. Conceptual content arises through the triadic relation among embodied sign use, public practices of correction and inference, and a constraining world or domain. Personhood emerges through affective attunement, joint attention, second-personal address, symbolic articulation, diachronic commitment, institutional incorporation, and reflexive revision. Freedom is reconstructed as situated, reasons-responsive self-government supported or obstructed by social capabilities. The account sharply separates viability standards, prudential goods, social norms, existential commitments, and moral validity. Because descriptive facts cannot entail categorical obligations, dignity is not derived from biology. Its normative basis is an explicit Reciprocal Justifiability Principle requiring actions and institutions affecting a subject to be defensible to that standpoint under conditions of inclusion, non-arbitrariness, and non-domination. Dignity is consequently understood as an irreducible relational-deontic status. TEP thereby preserves natural continuity without reduction or dualism, existential agency without supernaturalism, social constitution without relativism, and moral normativity without violating the is-ought distinction. // 本文提出转化式生成认知人格主义(Transformative Enactive Personalism, TEP),这是一种旨在化解存在哲学与生成认知科学之间主要张力的新哲学理论。TEP 既拒绝把生物意义生成同质地延伸为人格性,也拒绝在有机体与人格主体之间设置未经解释的本体论断裂。它将过程一元论与组织多元论结合起来:生命的、感受性的、语义的、人格性的和制度性的组织在物质上彼此连续,同时各自具有不同的同一性条件、正确性条件与持存条件。 该理论对生命、感受性、意义生成、语义内容、世界、人格主体、生存性、自主性、自由、规范、尊严和道德作出精确定义。它以具身符号使用、公共纠正以及具有约束力的世界或领域之间的三元关系来解释概念内容。它不把自由理解为因果独立,而是将其重构为处境化且具有理由响应性的自我治理。它区分可存续性标准、审慎善、社会规范、生存承诺与具有道德有效性的原则。 最重要的是,TEP 明确划定了实然—应然界限。关于自创生、进化、感受性、语言或社会承认的描述性事实,都不能演绎地蕴涵尊严。道德约束力来自一项独立陈明的相互可证成性原则(Reciprocal Justifiability Principle, RJ)。本体论事实识别该原则所适用的主体;该原则则确立这些主体在实践证成中不可替代的地位。由此形成的理论是自然主义的而非还原主义的,具有生存性而非超自然主义色彩,是由社会构成的而非相对主义的,也是规范性的,却并不从“实然”推出“应然”。