哈耶克"知识分散论"的逻辑跳跃:一项基于政治哲学圆融模型的批判性审视

Friedrich Hayek's theory of the dispersion of knowledge is widely regarded as one of the most original epistemological contributions of the 20th century. He argued that local knowledge dispersed among countless individuals cannot be grasped by any central planner, thereby defending the superiority of the market mechanism over planned economies. However, this paper identifies a previously overlooked logical leap in Hayek's reasoning: he deduces the necessity of private property directly from the premise of “individual ignorance,” yet fails to demonstrate why the agents exploring dispersed knowledge must be independent decision-makers holding private property rights. Using the Political Philosophy Cohesion Model as a diagnostic tool, this paper classifies this leap as a “completable dynamic deficiency” within Hayek's framework—his underlying axiom (individual ignorance) does not inherently preclude other institutional forms from fulfilling the function of exploring dispersed knowledge, but Hayek provided no general methodology for evaluating such institutional alternatives. The paper concludes with an open-ended question: while Hayek correctly diagnosed the knowledge problem of central planning, his specific institutional presuppositions warrant critical re-examination.