Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
This paper explores the relevance of psychiatric diagnoses to responsibility assessments, with a focus on criminal law. There is wide agreement that certain mental disorders and developmental conditions may impact one's capacity for responsible agency, but whether a diagnosis itself is relevant—and if so, how—remains unclear and controversial. A psychiatric diagnosis carries information about the mental differences or symptoms a person with that diagnosis might experience. Because of this, we argue that diagnoses are relevant to responsibility when they pick out symptoms or differences that are likely to undermine the specific capacities that matter for responsibility. We claim that where there is enough empirical evidence about the impact of a diagnosis on legal agency, a criminal court must investigate whether a defendant ought to be fully or partially excused. Intellectual disability is this sort of diagnosis. Evidence that a person has intellectual disability at the time of their wrongful act does not automatically settle the question of their responsibility, but this diagnosis requires that the court investigate the nature and degree of responsibility-relevant differences and symptoms experienced by that person at the time of the act in question.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Fagan et al. (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: