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The relationship between military spending and economic growth is debated, especially around how defense R&D creates technologies that benefit civilians. New innovations in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and advanced materials have shifted this discussion beyond simple trade-offs. We model how perceived threats emerge from relative military capabilities and how defense R&D generates knowledge externalities enhancing civilian productivity. Our framework yields several notable insights: stronger dual-use spillovers increase equilibrium growth rates while potentially raising military expenditures; international knowledge diffusion generates asymmetric effects on defense spending incentives across technologically advanced and developing countries; and non-cooperative military spending decisions typically result in inefficient arms races. The equilibrium characterized by our model exhibits excessive military spending relative to the social optimum due to the negative security externality, highlighting potential welfare benefits from international coordination mechanisms. By incorporating realistic features including imperfect competition, non-constant returns, and heterogeneous spillovers, we provide a comprehensive theoretical foundation for understanding when military expenditures complement or constrain economic development. Our results contribute to debates on defense industrial policy, technology transfer regulations, and international security cooperation in an era of intensifying technological competition.
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Sanusi et al. (2025) studied this question.
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