Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Demonstrates how horizontal mergers affect product quality in bargaining markets, indicating potential declines in quality.
We study the effects of horizontal mergers on product quality in a bilateral bargaining environment. In our model, a competition‐reducing merger reduces equilibrium quality as long as the buyer's marginal rate of substitution of quality for price declines with price, holding quality constant. This condition is closely related to quality being a normal good. This result holds when price and quality are jointly negotiated, and it extends to a sequential setting in which sellers first choose quality and then bargain with buyers over price. We discuss applications to procurement and healthcare markets, as well as several extensions.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Balan et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: