Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
The Southern Interconnection, a natural gas pipeline designed to link Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia’s network and facilitate access to global liquefied natural gas markets, has become a subject of intense political debate in the country. Despite Bosnia and Herzegovina’s marginal natural gas consumption, the United States invested unprecedented diplomatic capital in supporting this infrastructure project. Yet this external pressure encountered a structural constraint: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ethnic power-sharing system, which institutionalized veto capacity and enabled a single political party to obstruct the project for years. Integrating Neoliberal Institutionalism, Great Power Competition, and Fragile State theories, this study demonstrates that ethnic veto systems transform rational infrastructure projects into distributional conflicts. Through process-tracing of US diplomatic engagement, the analysis reveals that it succeeded not through initial normative pressure, but by resorting to coercive and transactional strategies – bypassing the veto player through coalition-building and pivoting to a foreign private-sector solution. American diplomatic pressure has successfully advanced the Southern Interconnection, but the mechanism of this success reveals fundamental limits to external power – it cannot resolve the ethnic distributional conflict or ensure project sustainability without continuous external commitment, thereby entrenching a capacity trap and necessitating the subsequent accommodation of veto player interests.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Čančar et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: