The Early Husserl on Concepts: From Bolzano to Kant?

This paper examines the shift from (late) modern to contemporary philosophy by examining Husserl’s early account of concepts. Given Husserl’s ambiguous allegiance in this transition, his treatment of concepts provides a privileged vantage point for understanding both his philosophy and his role in the shift toward contemporary philosophy. This paper argues that Husserl’s early view of concept (1896–1903) was strongly shaped by a Bolzanian, logical-objectivist framework, which he later reassessed in light of further developments. Against Ursula Neemann’s influential claim that Husserl ultimately broke with Bolzano in favor of a Kantian position, this study contends however that he neither abandoned core Bolzanian tenets nor returned to Kant. Rather, his reassessment arose from internal phenomenological concerns. The paper outlines Husserl’s early treatment of concepts. It recognizes Husserl’s indebtedness to and partial divergence from Bolzano. I reject Neemann’s thesis, while I highlight ontological and epistemological advances that made Husserl diverge from Bolzano.