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By exploiting the natural experiment of post-2022 sanctions against Russia, our study contributes to the sanctions literature by offering an empirical analysis of the determinants of the imposition of industry-specific trade sanctions from a cost-benefit point of view. We developed a specialized indicator designed to measure the intensity of trade sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) and the U.S.A. against Russia in 2022–24, as a share of 2021 trade that would be affected by corresponding trade bans, by 2-digit HS product groups. Using econometric techniques, we show that the sanctioning countries strategically focus on restricting trade flows in order to exert maximum economic pressure on the Russian economy, including effects along value chains. This is consistent with the point of view that the probability of success of sanctions increases with economic harm to the target economy. At the same time, we get no empirical evidence in favor of the deterrent effect of costs related to sanctions. The sanctioning countries do not impose less-intensive restrictions on the trade flows that are economically important to their economies, which seems to indicate the firmness of their intentions.
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Golovanova et al. (2026) studied this question.
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