Bipolarity and small powers: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989)

This paper examines the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its far-reaching implications for both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, situating the event within the bipolar international order of the Cold War. The paper uses theoretical perspectives on bipolarity and the roles of both great and small powers in international relations to explore how distinct domestic, regional, and international factors intersected and converged to drive Soviet action. While existing scholarship has primarily focused on the causes of the invasion, often framed in terms of Cold War rivalries and the offensive or defensive nature of the intervention, it tends to overlook the complex interplay of domestic, regional, and international factors that shaped the Soviet decision to intervene. By analysing four pivotal variables – Afghanistan’s domestic politics, the Brezhnev Doctrine, regional geopolitics, and international politics and the great power decision-making – this study aims to offer a nuanced and multifaceted understanding of the invasion’s broader significance within the context of the bipolar international system. This approach offers valuable insights for analysing contemporary conflicts in a world still shaped by great power competition, albeit in a different geopolitical context.