Comparative analysis examines how Iran and Turkiye achieve strategic autonomy amidst global shifts, indicating different approaches and trade-offs.
The transition of the international system from post-Cold War unipolarity toward a more competitive and fluid order has expanded both the room for maneuver and the risks facing middle powers. This article comparatively examines how Iran and Turkiye have adapted to this changing environment and assesses the extent to which their strategies have enabled strategic autonomy. Drawing on neoclassical realism, it analyzes the interaction between systemic pressures and domestic intervening variables, including elite perceptions, institutional capacity, legitimizing narratives, and political-economic vulnerabilities. The article argues that Iran has pursued strategic autonomy primarily through active resistance, asymmetric deterrence, and strategic depth, gaining a degree of normative and security autonomy while incurring major economic and diplomatic costs. Turkiye, by contrast, has relied on multi-vector pragmatism, flexible balancing, and hybrid power projection to widen its bargaining space, though at the cost of macroeconomic fragility and recurring tensions with traditional partners. The findings suggest that strategic autonomy is not a fixed condition but a relative and costly process shaped by how middle powers convert resources into sustained influence, manage domestic constraints, and navigate great power competition.
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Kerem TÜRK (2026) studied this question.
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