Power Transitions and Middle Power Agency: Türkiye’s Mediation Diplomacy

Power in the international system is becoming more diffuse. Amid intensifying great-power rivalry and the erosion of the rules and norms that underpinned much of the post-World War II global order, several countries in the Global South have become more active players on the world stage. This has extended to the realm of conflict mediation. This article explores the macro-level structural factors that may shape changes in these countries’ mediation behavior. It does so by drawing on Power Transition Theory (PTT) as a heuristic lens to assess the structural incentive environment for mediation. The two-level incentive framework developed here attempts to link the velocity of global and regional systemic changes to shifts in middle powers’ mediation behavior. It posits that incentives to mediate are weakest when hierarchies are stable globally and regionally and grow as change accelerates at either level. A quantitative operationalization of structural change and a qualitative review of Türkiye’s mediation engagement suggest that systemic turbulence may create conditions more conducive to mediation, but is not, on its own, sufficient to explain variation in mediation behavior. PTT’s structural logic helps examine how systemic shifts may reshape the risks, opportunities, and incentives for middle-power mediation.