Türkiye has emerged as an active state-level mediator, leveraging its geopolitical position and Davutoğlu’s ‘Strategic Depth’ doctrine. This article examines its mediation in Syria–Israel (2008), the Tehran Nuclear Declaration (2010), the Black Sea Grain Initiative (2022–2023), and Ethiopia–Somalia (2024–25), through the ‘interested mediator’ framework. It argues that Turkish mediation is shaped by a credibility–interest paradox, transactional logic, partisan alignments, and geopolitical entanglements that constrain neutrality. While Türkiye can facilitate dialogue and short-term agreements, these structural limitations have so far restricted its ability to achieve durable conflict resolution.
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Abhishek Yadav (2026) studied this question.
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