Supervisory strategies for agroecological security in plateau regions based on a four-party evolutionary game model

Conflicting interests among multiple stakeholders and regulatory imbalances are challenges faced by agricultural ecosystems in highland regions. Current governance models largely fail to reflect complex interactions among stakeholders, resulting in suboptimal outcomes. To address this problem, this study constructs a four-party asymmetric evolutionary game model that includes the government, regulatory agencies, agricultural enterprises, and local residents to analyze stakeholder strategy choices under different benefit conditions. It innovatively incorporates public supervision incentives and dynamic reward-penalty mechanisms into the regulatory system to demonstrate how the government can influence agricultural enterprises’ strategic choices through mechanism design. The evolution of the system is analyzed using a dynamic equation, and numerical simulations are performed using data on the ecological baseline of the plateau region and socioeconomic parameters. The findings indicate that effective long-term governance of plateau agricultural ecological security depends on the establishment of a reasonable cost-benefit distribution mechanism. Moreover, public participation in supervision mechanisms can effectively guide agricultural enterprises toward eco-friendly behavior. Additionally, dynamic reward-punishment mechanisms are advantageous for achieving long-term ecological security goals. The scientific value of this study lies in proposing a collaborative regulatory mechanism for plateau agricultural ecological security from a game theory perspective, and its research paradigm provides a theoretical reference for complex regulatory problems in other fields. Based on these findings, we recommend a collaborative governance mechanism that combines dynamic rewards and punishments with public participation to improve governance efficiency and achieve the sustainable development of the plateau’s economy and ecology.