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The study examines how misperceptions of demand signal correlation affect behavior in a duopoly, highlighting implications for agents' beliefs.
We study misperceptions of private-signal correlation in an incomplete-information Cournot duopoly game. Exaggerating the correlation between players' demand signals is beneficial when agents hold flexible beliefs about price elasticity but is harmful when their beliefs are dogmatically correct. For agents with flexible beliefs who learn elasticity by observing prices, correlation misperceptions indirectly distort behavior through elasticity misinference. If agents know the true elasticity, this learning channel is eliminated. Correlation misperceptions have opposite direct and indirect effects on behavior, so the presence of elasticity inference can reverse an error's viability. (JEL C72, D21, D43, D81, D82, D83)
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He et al. (2026) studied this question.
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