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The transition from OPV to IPV in global polio eradication requires careful management and likely multiple IPV doses to prevent outbreaks of vaccine-derived polioviruses.
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has been making great strides. In 2017, the number of children reported with paralysis caused by wild-type poliovirus was just 22, and during 2017–2018 transmission has only been detected for serotype 1, in Afghanistan and Pakistan (as of July 2018). Serotypes 2 and 3 wild poliovirus have not been detected since 1999 and 2012, respectively. However, the polio endgame is complex and challenging. The oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) used in mass campaigns to stop transmission of wild polioviruses is genetically unstable and on rare occasions can evolve to regain wild-type virulence and transmissibility [1] . This has resulted in outbreaks of poliomyelitis caused by vaccine-derived polioviruses, which have gained in significance over time relative to the declining burden of wild-type disease. To prevent these outbreaks, the GPEI concluded in 2003 that vaccination with OPV must stop [2]. The global withdrawal of OPV began in April 2016 with serotype 2 OPV, after certification of the global eradication of this serotype of wild-poliovirus. During a 2-week period, >150 countries replaced trivalent with bivalent (serotypes 1 and 3) oral vaccine in their routine and supplementary immunization programs. At the same time, ≥1 dose of (trivalent) inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) was introduced into the routine immunization schedule in countries previously relying solely on OPV for protection. This single dose protects at least half of those who are vaccinated against paralytic disease, if exposed to polioviruses, but supply constraints and low coverage of routine immunization services means that the security offered by this policy is limited [3]. As a result, there is a growing global cohort of children without any immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus. Since April 2016, several outbreaks of poliomyelitis caused by serotype 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses have occurred, including large epidemics in Syria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The response to these outbreaks requires the use of serotype 2 OPV, which can be approved for release by the director general of the World Health Organization. Vaccination campaigns with monovalent serotype 2 OPV can effectively stop these outbreaks, but at the same time they risk generating new vaccine-derived polioviruses through spread and reversion of the vaccine poliovirus in susceptible populations. The articles included in this Clinical Infectious Diseases supplement present important new research on the transmission of vaccine polioviruses after immunization with OPV and the protection offered by alternative vaccination schedules. This research is critical for our understanding of the risks of continued OPV use and the optimal strategies that should be adopted by the GPEI to minimize these risks. Several articles present results from a study of vaccine poliovirus transmission after administration of trivalent OPV in 2015 to children during mass campaigns in 3 Mexican communities [4–6]. This study is particularly informative about the impact of IPV on household and community transmission of vaccine polioviruses because Mexico switched to an IPV-only routine immunization schedule in 2007. Transmission of vaccine poliovirus was detected in 18% of households contacts and 7% of community contacts [4]. Within households, the mothers of vaccinated children were most likely to be infected, followed by their unvaccinated siblings and then fathers. The prevalence of shedding was significantly lower among community contacts who had previously received OPV but not IPV. This suggests IPV would be a less effective barrier to community transmission than OPV. Community transmission was rapid and without clear spatial structure [5]. Mathematical modeling of these shedding data resulted in estimates of the effective reproduction number (R) for vaccine poliovirus of <1, with the highest number for serotype 2 [6]. The low value of this measure of transmissibility, below the threshold for sustained transmission (R = 1), is consistent with the limited community transmission observed in the study. However, the same model suggests that 5 years after serotype 2 OPV withdrawal, the effective R value for this serotype of poliovirus could be >1, leading to a substantial outbreak. There is, of course, some uncertainty around this conclusion, but it does highlight the risks of further serotype 2 circulation in the context of a growing global cohort of children unimmunized with this serotype of OPV, even in a community with good IPV coverage. This supports efforts to reduce the risk of reintroducing wild or vaccine polioviruses after eradication to populations through containment of such viruses, as well as detection of chronic immunodeficient shedders of poliovirus and development of antiviral drugs [7, 8]. The limited impact of IPV on community transmission of vaccine poliovirus is explained by the limited intestinal mucosal protection induced by this vaccine compared with live-attenuated OPV. This is elegantly demonstrated by Brickley et al [9], who use polio pseudoviruses to measure neutralizing antibodies in stool after immunization of Chilean infants with serotypes 1 and 3 bivalent OPV (bOPV) and IPV, or IPV alone. They found that only about 30% of infants immunized with these schedules have neutralizing antibodies to serotype 2 poliovirus detectable in stool, whereas serum neutralizing antibodies could be detected in 97%. In addition, among infants receiving bOPV, neutralizing antibody to serotype 1 in stool could be detected in 89%, indicating effective induction of a mucosal immune response by bOPV. The need for intestinal exposure to poliovirus to generate effective mucosal protection is confirmed by studies of vaccine poliovirus shedding after administration of a challenge dose of OPV. A review of recent studies shows consistently high rates of shedding after challenge among children immunized with IPV and bOPV after a serotype 2 OPV challenge (except in Pakistan and India, where OPV immunogenicity was lower [10]), and in Cuba no reduction in shedding of serotype 2 virus was observed when comparing children receiving IPV plus bOPV with those who received IPV alone or no vaccine [11]. Doses of IPV given later in the routine immunization schedule were found to be more immunogenic, consistent with an inhibitory role of maternally derived serum neutralizing antibodies [12]. After a single dose of IPV, seroconversion was observed in 51%–79% of infants in the studies reviewed by Bandyopadhyay et al [10], with significant variation between study sites. This seroconversion rate increased to 83%–100% after 2 doses, consistent with the prime-boost mode of action of IPV. Indeed, after just 1 dose of IPV, priming or seroconversion was recorded in >90% of infants, when priming is defined as an early (anamnestic) response 7 days after the second dose of IPV. The significance of immune priming for protection against poliomyelitis is unknown, although case-control estimates of the effectiveness of a single dose of IPV against poliomyelitis suggest that seroconversion is a more accurate correlate of protection [3, 13]. Bhaumik et al [14] examines this in more detail in macaques, reporting that a single dose of IPV induced priming and a memory B-cell response despite the absence of a serum neutralizing antibody response in the majority of animals. However, after a peak at 90 days, memory B-cell numbers rapidly declined, and these cells were undetectable in the circulation at 150 days. By contrast, after 2 doses of IPV, all animals seroconverted and had a long-lasting memory B-cell response. This suggests that ≥2 doses of IPV are required to induce long-lasting protection against poliomyelitis and supports recommendations from the World Health Organization Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Immunisation for a 2-dose IPV schedule for ≥10 years in all countries following withdrawal of all OPV after successful eradication of all 3 serotypes is certified. The successful eradication of all polioviruses will depend not only on containment, but also on rapid detection and response to wild-type or vaccine-derived poliovirus outbreaks. This requires sensitive surveillance responsive to the changing nature of the risks to eradication. Matrajt et al [15] review approaches to environmental surveillance that can enhance sensitivity, and Verma et al [16] and Diaz-Quinonez et al [17] describe the use of seroprevalence surveys to monitor vaccination coverage and identify gaps in immunity. With a rapidly evolving polio endgame, new approaches to surveillance and innovative research on poliovirus vaccines and vaccination strategies have never been more important. Supplement sponsorship. This editorial appears as part of the supplement “Polio endgame and beyond: Vaccine choices, transmission dynamics, and surveillance implications,” sponsored by The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Potential conflicts of interest. All authors: No reported conflicts. All authors have submitted the ICMJE Form for Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest. Conflicts that the editors consider relevant to the content of the manuscript have been disclosed.
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Grassly et al. (2018) studied this question.
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