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In 1980, Massachusetts enacted a unique and comprehensive process for siting hazardous waste facilities. No facility has been constructed or approved since then, however, so it seems appropriate to ask whether the process was fundamentally flawed in concept, implemented imperfectly, or whether some other lesson can be drawn. The authors of this study were closely involved with the legislation at its inception, and Sanderson has stayed involved with it professionally, most recently as manager of the Clean Harbors project. In this essay they combine analysis and memoir to examine the reasons why the Massachusetts siting process has not yet delivered a facility. They argue that the critical factors were both specific design defects of the law itself and general characteristics of the Massachusetts public decisionmaking process. The Massachusetts negotiated compensation model of facility siting is so complicated in practice, and so contingent on local factors, that no one can judge confidently whether it is on the whole hopeless, flawed but correctable, or merely unlucky. We believe its principal liability is that it offers two fatal temptations: to public officials, it appears to offer an alternative to taking leadership risks; and to frightened citizens, it appears to offer a way tomore » avoid, rather than confront and control, physical risks and anxiety. Specific features of the process - its complexity, the inherent delay, the unfortunate design of the siting council - might be corrected with good effect. But we see larger and more pervasive forces as the real obstacle. The NIMBY problem is, at heart, symptomatic of the pessimistic expectations; raising those expectations is not a task that can be accomplished by any legislated decision process. 4 refs., 1 tabs.« less
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O’Hare et al. (1993) studied this question.
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