Polanyi's “From-To” Knowing and His Contribution to the Phenomenology of Skilled Motor Behavior

Recent articles by Moe and Breivik address the need for sport philosophers to pursue analyses of skilled-motor behavior (2; 4; 5). Relying on literature in the philosophy of mind and phenomenological traditions, these authors urge others to help fill this void. This essay is a modest attempt to do so. Using Michael Polanyi’s work, Meaning (7), I intend to supplement and extend the analyses of skilledmotor behavior presented by Moe and Breivik. From these three perspectives, I will examine kinds of knowing and how our intellect operates at the tacit and focal levels during the learning and performance of complex motor activities. I will begin by highlighting the key ideas in both Moe and Breivik’s writings, including Moe’s focus on Hubert Dreyfus’ and John Searle’s accounts of “background capacities” (4; 5) and Breivik’s critiques of Dreyfus’ understanding of “absorbed coping” (2). I will then introduce the analyses of Michael Polanyi and his framework for understanding skill development. Both his theory of “from-to” knowing—specifically his analyses of focal and subsidiary awareness—and his treatment of tacit dynamics—the casting forth of intentional actions through links between intuition, imagination, and ideas—will be presented (7: pp. 57–61). I will further show how Polanyi’s views of skilled motor activity supplement and clarify Moe’s notion of “background knowledge” as well as extend Breivik’s emphasis on conscious attention in athletic performances. In the final section of this paper, I will use cycling to exemplify this extended analysis of skilled motor behavior in sport. Through this analysis, not only will the depth of the philosophy of motor learning literature be expanded, but hopefully new insight will be gained into the creation of intentional movement in sport.