Passing, Traveling and Reality: Social Constructionism and the Metaphysics of Race

Among race theorists, the view that race is a social construction is widespread. While the term ‘social construction ’ is sometimes intended to mean merely that race does not (as once believed) constitute a robust, biological natural kind, it often labels the stronger position that race is real, but not a biological kind. For example, Charles Mills (1998) writes that, ‘‘the task of those working on race is to put race in quotes, ‘race’, while still insisting that nevertheless, it exists (and moves people)’’(xiv, italics his). It is to ‘‘make a plausible social ontology neither essentialist, innate, nor transhistorical, but real enough for all that’’ (xiv). Racial constructionism, thus conceived, is a metaphysical position that contrasts both with the view that race is an important biological kind (racial naturalism) and with the more recent claim that race does not exist (racial skepticism). The desire for a constructionist metaphysics of race emerges against the background of a cluster of normative disputes, including: 1. Labeling Practices: Is the use of any racial terms to pick out various human groups or subgroups by arbitrary bodily features useful or permissible? 2. Terminology: Should term x be used in social life, social theory or social science? 3. Significance of Racial Identity: What is the value of racial identification of oneself or others? Is racial identification morally significant? Is the social enforcement of racial identification morally permissible? Is it morally required? To simplify, we can characterize these normative disputes as disputes over the value of ‘race ’ talk. 1 By ‘‘‘race ’ talk’ ’ I mean talk that uses ‘race ’ and