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As is widely acknowledged, Asia is a trove of comparative law as a result of its political, social, economic, and religious diversity.1 Hence, it comes as no surprise that constitutional development in East and Southeast Asia has spurred much more discussion in recent decades. Compared with its Korean or Indonesian counterpart, however, the Constitution of Taiwan (officially known as Constitution of the Republic of China) and its evolution have not received enough attention. Given the endurance and vibrancy of Taiwan’s Constitution and its Constitutional Court, the inclusion of Taiwan will certainly enrich our understanding on constitutionalism. The Constitution of Taiwan: A Contextual Analysis, written by Jiunn-rong Yeh at National Taiwan University, is one of the most important works of literature in this field. In his book, Jiunn-rong Yeh identifies the two highest achievements of Taiwan’s constitutional development: transformative constitutionalism and civic constitutionalism. In terms of transformative constitutionalism, he argues that “the Constitution has become a routine source of support for political resolutions and even projects of social capacity-building” (at 242) after the political cataclysm and the constitutional hibernation during the authoritarian era. This does not necessarily imply that juristocracy has taken hold in Taiwan. Instead, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court adopts a pro-dialogue approach that facilitates the rise of civic constitutionalism, in which “the strength and resilience of civic engagement [] pushes towards democratic transition and constitutional reform” (at 242). Notwithstanding these two achievements, constitutional developments in Taiwan, Yeh suggests, confront three thorny and in fact interwoven issues: the infeasibility of formal constitutional change, political gridlock, and fragile constitutional sovereignty (at 246–252). This book review focuses on the achievements and challenges outlined in this book and proposes some reflections gleaned from the case of Taiwan. Few constitutional transformations can be more radical than what took place in Taiwan without enacting a brand-new constitution. Originally promulgated in China and designed for a geographically immense country, the Constitution was clearly unsuitable for Taiwan, either as a legal document or as a political creed. After seven rounds of constitutional amendments in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the constitution has been dramatically revised. In Chapters 3–6 of his book, Yeh articulates the institutional and functional change of the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches. To name just a few, the governmental system has been altered from parliamentarism to semi-presidentialism (at 57–59), owing to the direct election of the president and the expansion of presidential power; the three-parliament design (i.e., the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan) has been reduced to one, thanks to the transformation of the Control Yuan2 (at 94–97) and the abolition of the National Assembly (at 97–100); and the judiciary has garnered further ancillary powers of political salience (at 164–165). In addition, relations between the central and local governments have been adjusted to political reality. This is particularly evident as it concerns the legal status of Taiwan Province (at 135–136), i.e., whether Taiwan is an independent country or merely a province of a country that is officially known as the Republic of China. These constitutional transformations not only “Taiwanize” the constitution (at 3–4), but also raise people’s consciousness of the constitution. Both have galvanized civil society into legal action, with an eye to the protection of constitutional rights (at 195–201) and the incorporation of international human rights (at 232–238). Although civic engagement takes place mostly after democratization, it does not imply that civil society plays no role during the process of democratization. Conversely, scholars have maintained that democratization would not be possible without the involvement of civil society in Taiwan.3 Starting from the Wild Lily Student Movement, voluntary civic gatherings have precipitated the progress of political liberation, and the rise of the Sunflower Movement in 2014 lent further support to this contention.4 In fact, as alluded to by Jiunn-rong Yeh, the interaction of transformative constitutionalism and civic constitutionalism answers a question that puzzles many students of constitutional law: why do some constitutional courts crumble after democratization but not others? Put it differently, why are some courts more successful than others in functioning as constitutional guardians? Although the concept of constitutionalism does not necessarily include judicial supremacy in theory, apex courts in liberal democracies usually become the final arbiter of all constitutional controversies in practice. This is particularly the case in nascent democracies where democratic institutions, such as parliaments or elections, can be a sham because of the lack of historical and institutional conditions that could guarantee their functioning.5 Disappointed by the political branches, it is natural that the public will go to courts to pursue their political agenda. This state of affairs has been dubbed “the judicialization of politics”6 in which the judiciary has stepped into the political arena and participated in national policymaking. This often raises tensions between courts and the elected branches, prompting political attacks on the judiciary and ultimately resulting in the shutdown of some constitutional courts.7 To address this challenge, students of constitutional law have advanced various models of popular constitutionalism.8 Civic constitutionalism, as proposed by Yeh in this book, is one such model, which does not question the legitimacy of judicial supremacy per se but “focuses on how popular social movements outside the courts transform the norms that ultimately are accepted by the courts.”9 In Taiwan, civic groups and public interest lawyers have repeatedly adopted litigation as part of their strategies to bring about social change.10 And Taiwan’s Constitutional Court occasionally responds positively to such attempts for two reasons. First, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court, unlike most of its counterparts in other new democracies, was established during the authoritarian period when it served as a rubber stamp (at 167–168). Cooperating with civil society after democratization may enhance its judicial reputation among the public. Second, civic constitutionalism in this sense also rebuts accusations that the judiciary is anti-democratic and prevents political retaliation. This does not mean that Taiwan’s Constitutional Court has never ruled against the public or never been attacked. In general, however, the Constitutional Court is a majoritarian, rather than counter-majoritarian, institution.11 From this perspective, the two achievements Yeh identifies in this book are mutually reinforcing. The case of Taiwan therefore seems to provide a successful example of striking the balance between majority rule and strong-form judicial review. It also demonstrates that civic engagement can remain robust, as Yeh persuasively points out, alongside judicial finality. But one question has been left unanswered: why does civic society in Taiwan remain vigilant and vigorous? Most versions of civic constitutionalism prefer weak-form judicial review, because strong-form judicial review not only discourages dialogue between the branches but also “diminishes the constitutional responsibilities of other actors with respect to the judicially enforceable constitution.”12 Furthermore, judges of top courts usually come from upper-middle-class backgrounds and speak in legal jargon that can be difficult for the public to comprehend.13 Inasmuch as these are also true in Taiwan, why is civic engagement in Taiwan more vibrant and sustainable than it is in other young but declining democracies, such as those in Central and Eastern Europe, where “civil society were either decimated or colon ized”14 ? The issue is more perplexing given that the Constitutional Court in Taiwan is highly trusted and respected, and that the legislature is not of particularly poor quality, compared with the parliaments in other nascent democracies. Yeh is fully aware of this question,15 but he provides no answer. As to the three challenges—the difficulty of constitutional amendment, political stalemates, and Taiwan’s fragile sovereignty—they actually strengthen, rather than weaken, the development of transformative constitutionalism and civic constitutionalism. The political impasse and societal cleavage in Taiwan result mainly from different imaginations of national identity: most citizens regard themselves as Taiwanese, but a small minority as Chinese. Facing the political gridlock caused by the sovereignty issue, which is normally a political question, there is not much the judiciary can do. This explains the constitutional crisis that broke out abruptly in 2014 when the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement with China was passed by the legislature without due process. Eventually, civic mobilization, dubbed the Sunflower Student Movement, successfully stopped the farce. This event reveals the impotence of a court-centered model of constitutionalism and echoes Yeh’s observation that future constitutional change will have to be a citizen-centered enterprise, given the supermajority threshold of constitutional revision (at 246–247). In fact, constitutional change spearheaded by civil society further evinces the paradigm shift of constitutional identity from the bottom. Although the preamble of the constitutional amendments prescribes the reunification with China, the capital-C Constitution on this score no longer represents “We the Taiwanese People.” Due to the Chinese civil war and the intimidation by Beijing authorities, which consider constitutional enactments in Taiwan to be a declaration of independence, the gap between the capital- and the small-c constitution is arguably wider than in most democracies. Given the political reality and procedural hurdles, civic constitutionalism through constitutional interpretation, which essentially becomes constitution-making, will play a more critical role in constructing the constitutional identity.16 Namely, the small-c constitution and unwritten constitution may be more pivotal than the capital-C Constitution in understanding the constitutional contours of Taiwan. Given Yeh’s emphasis on civic engagement, however, it is a pity that the role of lawyers does not receive enough scrutiny in this book. Lawyers have fought for political freedom in many parts of the world, and they have played an important role in Taiwan’s constitutional development.17 Lawyers not only facilitate civil mobilization by bridging the gap between political and judicial elites and the public. In Taiwan, the nexus between politics and legal professionals is strong with many lawyers occupying high political offices including that of the president and legislators. Former President Chen, for example, was an attorney defending political dissenters before he started running for office; some legislators and cabinet members, such as Yu Mei-nu, Wang Ju-hsuan, and Thomas Chan, were public interest lawyers. This change of career suggests that the conceptual distinction between top-down and bottom-up constitutionalism may be hard to draw in Taiwan, where practicing lawyers indeed play a leading role both in shaping transformative constitutionalism and civic constitutionalism. Last but not least, in another article coauthored with Wen Chen Chang, Yeh has argued that Taiwan shows four distinctive features of what the article called “East Asian constitutionalism,” which does not merely replicate either Western constitutionalism or Asian values.18 In this book, however, the role and place of those features of “East Asian constitutionalism” remains unclear. This raises the question of whether the two achievements identified in this book are peculiar to the constitutional development in Taiwan or if they apply to other Asian legal systems as well. Specifically, although Yeh stresses that transformative constitutionalism can be carried out through “constitutional revisions, judicial decisions, and public discourse” (at 243), there is no denying that judicial decisions often play the most decisive role in practice. The same-sex marriage decision promulgated in May 2017 is the best example. With the assistance of public interest lawyers, gay couples successfully brought their cases all the way to the Constitutional Court after several years of legal mobilization and social movement that have changed the political wind and social atmosphere. Ultimately, it was still the Constitutional Court, rather than the legislature, that first recognized a right to same-sex marriage. From this perspective, the emergence of transformative constitutionalism in Taiwan seems hardly extraordinary, given the global trend toward the judicialization of politics. Likewise, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court is not the only tribunal that adopts a dialogic approach facilitating civic constitutionalism.19 Indeed, both its dialogic interpretative method20 and some form of civic constitutionalism have been prevalent in other jurisdictions for decades. It seems plaus ible to suggest the two achievements identified by Jiunn-rong Yeh are actually shared by most successful constitutional courts around the globe. Due to its international and domestic political environments, Taiwan is never short of cutting-edge issues in comparative constitutional law. This book is by no means simply an introduction to Taiwan’s constitutional evolution. Yeh’s insightful analyses shed new light on many topics such as civic constitutionalism, transitional constitutionalism, transnational constitutionalism, constitutional identity, unconstitutional constitutional amendments, etc. Although this book has left some puzzles unanswered, it is definitely a must read not only for those who are interested in Taiwan in particular, but also for students of (comparative) constitutional law in general.
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Chien-Chih Lin (2018) studied this question.
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