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JT SEEMS to be the case that in his political writings John Locke was trying to find an equilibrium between consent, natural law, and natural rights, such that no one of these (taken by itself) constitutes his complete concept of right, and such that in Lockean politics one sets up, by voluntary and contract, a political order which guarantees the natural rights which one has in virtue of natural law.1 In all of Locke's mature works, certainly, consent, contractarianism, voluntarily produced polities and obligations, have a great deal of weight, even if these do not displace or replace natural laws and rights.2 This is true not only of the Second Treatise (though it is the best example), but of such works as the Third Letter for Toleration (1692)-a work in which Locke, exasperated with an opponent's claim that societies are instituted [by God] for the attaining all the benefits which civil society or political government can yield (including salvation), finally exclaims: If you will say, that commonwealths are not voluntary societies constituted by men, and by men freely entered into... that commonwealths are constituted by God for which he has appointed, without the and of men... I shall desire you to prove it.3 Locke's view, as is well known, was that even though God has moral and political ends in the form of natural laws and rights,4 the consent and contrivance of men is necessary if those ends are to be effective on earth because men must voluntarily set up a known and indifferent judge who will require men to conform their conduct to God's appointed ends: The law of nature would ... be in vain, if there were nobody... [that]... had a to execute that law.5 And the power which executes that law must be set up by and contract, since there is no natural political authority. Now Locke's most familiar contractarian arguments are of course to be found in the Second Treatise. Sometimes -indeed, repeatedlyhe contents himself with the bare claim that creates political right, as in section 102 (politic societies all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors, and forms of government),6 and in section 192 (rulers must put the people under such a frame of government, as they willingly, and of choice, to).7 Occasionally, however, Locke provides a more elaborate argument,
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Patrick Riley (1976) studied this question.
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