Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle

Philosophy journals and conferences have recently seen several attempts to argue that 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey strict transitivity. This paper focuses on Larry Temkin's argument in Intransitivity and Mere Addition Paradox. Although his argument is not aimed just at utilitarians or even consequentialists in general, it is of particular significance to consequentialists. If 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey transitivity, there may be choice situations in which there is no optimal choice, which would seem to open door to a consequentialist account of moral dilemmas. Temkin's argument crucially appeals to what he calls the Person-Affecting Principle (PAP), which he roughly characterizes as follows, On PAP, one outcome is than another only if it affects people for worse This paper argues that PAP, although plausible, does not hold in precisely those situations in which it would have to hold in order for Temkin's argument against transitivity to work.