Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Within a realist Aristotelian paradigm, this paper explores the concepts of ‘self-of-virtue’ and ‘virtue identity’, its correspondent self-concept. Distinguishing the ‘fundamental disposition’ to virtue growth, which defi nes a self-of-virtue, from the particular dispositions of virtues, we conceptualize virtue growth as an ‘integrative’ and ‘open free systemic’ reality based on phronesis-guided action, and we describe the ‘unifi ed moral self of rationally grounded emotions’. We address the radical difference between virtue identity and moral identity, and we propose a processual model for self-of-virtue development, unfolding its pedagogical aspects and suggesting that refocussing on the development of self-of-virtue would help to avoid atomized virtue education.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Manuel Joaquín Fernández González (2019) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: